Consider the following scenario: A named plaintiff files a class action suit on behalf of hundreds of tenants for breach of contract evaluate all factual and legal claims relevant to certification. 3 Under the approach suggested by the Fourth Circuit, a district court must ignore the named representative's time bar at certification.
The district court grants certification and orders the class representative and attorney to send out notice to absent class members. The par- ties and the court then begin the costly and time-consuming discovery process.
After certification, notice, and discovery, the defendant files a motion for summary judgment against the class representative on the basis of the statute of limitations defense. The district court predictably grants summary judgment against the representative. At this point,' courts and commentators can agree that the representative is unfit. The delay, however, has created a Hobson's choice for the district court: Either decertify the class or allow the substitution of a new representative.
If the district court decertifies, then the notice, discovery, and litigation costs to date are wasted. Automatically allowing substitution, on the other hand, creates four problems: First, a representative's inadequate representation or atypical legal claims can often signal classwide internal difficulties that substitution cannot remedy. Second, certification itself will create pressure for a settlement that ignores differences between class members with timely and others with timebarred claims. 6 Third, routine substitution may deny the defendant adequate notice of the type and scope of her liability before the statute of limitations has run. Fourth, automatic substitution reinforces the incentives for class attorneys to name a single representative hastily. Multiple and diverse representatives would give the district court better information about the individuals who constitute the class, facilitating more effective case management.! This Comment proposes that federal district courts investigate a named representative's time bar at certification. If the statute of limitations bars the named representative's claim, the district court should only certify for clearly specified, compelling reasons. District courts should also adopt a presumption towards striking the class complaint when the statute of limitations bars the named representative's claims.
Part I explains the procedure for selecting named representatives and certifying a class action. It details the sequence of events leading to the district court's discovery of the named representative's time bar. Part II describes how the time-barred representative can fail to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23. Part III recommends evaluating these issues at certification and adopting a presumption towards striking the class complaint if the district court refuses certification.
I. COMPETING APPROACHES TO THE FAILURE OF THE NAMED REPRESENTATIVES TO SATISFY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Federal courts have approached the time-barred representative differently, but some generally accepted principles about class actions and statutes of limitations underlie their decisions. The class action device combines the legal claims of many individual plaintiffs to conserve both judicial and litigant resources. Although aggregating these claims can streamline justice and vindicate the legal claims of absent class members, the class action device poses special due process problems. Rule 23 attempts to curb the potential for abuse by establishing unique procedural safeguards for class action suits. As part of these unique safeguards, certain class members must step forward and actively participate in the suit. 9 These class members, or named representatives, have the opportunity to supervise the class attorney actively."' More importantly, named representatives provide the district court with salient, prototypical, and concrete examples of class members.
The district court will usually consider Rule 23 requirements in a special certification hearing. The certification hearing will determine whether the action can be brought as a class action." Even after the certification hearing, however, the district court retains the discretion to limit the size of the class, force a clearer definition of the class, require the substitution of current representatives, or decertify and strike the class complaint. 12 Time-barred representatives can fail to satisfy Rule 23 requirements. Courts disagree over whether a district court can consider the timeliness of a representative's claim at certification. The Fourth Circuit, for instance, prohibits district courts from evaluating a representative's time bar at certification. The Fourth Circuit seeks to preserve the independence of certification hearings: a certification hearing should not become a truncated decision on the merits.1 3 Deciding the underlying validity of the claims too early will compromise the procedural safeguards of a full trial. Some district courts, however, emphasize resolving the fitness of the named representative "as soon as practical."' 5 Delaying the resolution of issues critical to certification threatens to compromise the efficiency goals of Rule 23. Delay may have fairness implications as well. As a result, these district courts evaluate statute of limitations defenses at certification. This Part describes the goals and operation of statute of limitations in the class action device to help evaluate these competing claims.
A. The Named Representative's Role in a Federal Class Action
The federal class action enables large numbers of people to aggregate similar claims, for either damages or injunctions, in a single lawsuit." Hundreds and sometimes thousands of individual plaintiffs, or class members, obviously cannot participate in the direction of the suit in the same way that individual plaintiffs participate in a traditional lawsuit. Instead, the district court selects one or more individuals from the class to participate in the litigation and to protect the interests of other class members. These individuals, or named representatives, must satisfy several requirements outlined by Rule 23. ' 8 Most importantly, the named representatives must adequately protect the interests of the class and present typical legal claims.' 9 The Due Process Clause requires the selection of named representatives and class attorneys who will effectively guard the property interests of absent class members. As the most involved class members, the named representatives can more effectively influence the class attordenying class certification" when the class representative's complaint was time-barred [67:805 ney and participate in major litigation decisions.
2 1 As the most salient class members, the named representatives offer the district court concrete examples of the legal claims of the broader class.2 The named representatives' disproportionate influence over the class attorney and court require carefully aligning the interests of named representatives and absent class members.
In a large, complex class action suit, a single representative may be unable to represent the spectrum of individual claims that compose the class. Both Rule 23 and federal courts contemplate that several named representatives, with slightly different legal or factual claims, might represent the claims of the class more effectively.2 Consequently, larger and more diverse classes will often have multiple representatives.2 21 The Supreme Court has expressed concern when attorneys name representatives only after determining the rough shape of the final settlement. Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp, 527 US 815, 119 S Ct 2295,2319 n 31 (1999). The Fifth Circuit has also relied on the named representatives to make decisions advancing the interests of the broader class. See Pettway v American Cast Iron Pipe Co, 576 F2d 1157,1177-78 (5th Cir 1978) (deciding that the initial decision to appeal should presumptively rest with the class representatives, although the class attorney should be able to bring arguments before the court that might protect the interest of absent class members). Some academics have criticized the vision of the named representative as active monitor. The named representative has a small stake in the outcome, is usually chosen by the attorney, and the attorney avoids named representatives that will exert significant control. See Jonathan R. Macey The plaintiffs' attorney generally recommends one or more named representatives to the district court.' As soon as practical, the district court holds a certification hearing to determine the fitness of the named representatives.2 At the certification hearing, the district court has three options. First, a district court can grant certification if the named representative clearly satisfies Rule 23 requirements.V Second, a district court can grant conditional certification if it lacks the evidence to refuse certification but fears that fuller discovery or subsequent events will reveal the named representatives' unfitness.f Third, the district court can refuse certification if the named representatives clearly fail to satisfy Rule 23 requirements. Upon refusing certification, the district court can either dismiss the class complaint or order remedial steps. Remedial steps might include limiting the size of the class, forcing the plaintiffs' attorney to more clearly define the scope of the class complaint, or allowing the substitution of other class members as named representatives. 29 If the district court orders remedial steps, the district court will almost certainly grant certification after the plaintiffs' attorney has complied with its order." After the district court grants certification, the plaintiffs' attorney will send notice of the action to absent class members, and full discovery will begin as the parties proceed to trial.
C. The Purpose and Operation of Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations require plaintiffs to file suit within a specified period of time after the defendant's wrongful conduct. If the plaintiffs fail to file suit within that time period, courts refuse to consider the underlying validity of the cause of action. 31 Statutes of limitations prevent the deterioration of evidence, facilitate fairness to de- rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin" for the proposition that district courts should not evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits at certification. 4 7 In Eisen, the district court held a preliminary hearing on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, and, after determining that the plaintiff was "more than likely" to prevail on the merits, forced the defendants to bear 90 percent of the notice costs. The Supreme Court reversed the imposition of notice costs, remarking that nothing in Rule 23 gives the district court the authority to conduct a hearing on the merits. The Supreme Court worried that allowing such a procedure would defeat the purpose of the Rule 23 requirements by allowing the named representative to obtain the advantages of a class action before satisfying Rule 23's requirements for representation. The Supreme Court also expressed concern that a preliminary trial on the merits would deprive the defendant of the procedural and evidentiary safeguards applicable only to a full trial.
Courts concerned about the Eisen restriction on evaluating the merits of the claim before certification defer statute of limitations issues until the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment. 9 If the court grants summary judgment against the named representatives prior to trial, then the court must resolve the status of the class action.n At this point, the court can allow substitution by other class members, limit the size of the class, or decertify the class. 49 The Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have allowed district courts to decide motions for summary judgment against named representatives before the certification hearing. See Schweizer v Trans Union Corp, 136 F3d 233,239 (2d Cir 1998) ("The decision to award summary judgment before acting on class certification was well within the discretion of the district court.");Jibson v Michigan Education Association-NEA, 30 F3d 723,734 (6th Cir 1994) (allowing the district court to resolve a single issue in the case at summary judgment before addressing the issue of certification). A district court might be able to use this device to dismiss a time-barred named representative before certification, but it has several limitations. First, some courts refuse to allow it. See Peritz v Liberty Loan Corp, 523 F2d 349, 353-55 (7th Cir 1975) (declaring the procedure violative of Eisen's prohibition against evaluating claims on the merits at certification). Second, a motion for summary judgment against the named representative alone will not resolve any of the issues relating to the class. See Smith v Shawnee Library System, 60 F3d 317, 322 (7th Cir 1995) (refusing to grant class-wide effects to summary judgment against named representative because lack of effective certification voided initial certification decision). Both the plaintiff and defendant may desire to resolve the issues in the context of the certification decision. Part II suggests that the named representative's time bar will often interact with Rule 23 in complex ways, and the defendant may be reluctant to divorce those inquiries. Finally, a defendant may be reluctant to bring a motion for summary judgment against a single individual very early in the litigation, before full discovery, because she wishes to bring the motion on other grounds in the alternative.
5
The Fourth Circuit has disqualified representatives after granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment but refused to grant district courts the power to determine those issues at certification. See, for example, International Woodworkers, 659 F2d at 1270.
II. A TIME BAR TO THE NAMED REPRESENTATIVES' ACTION CAN

CREATE SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEMS UNDER RULE 23(A)
The failure of all of the named representatives in a class action to satisfy the statute of limitations can create several difficulties under Rule 23. Rule 23(a) describes the general requirements for the maintenance of a class action. 55 The district court must also sort the class action into one of three categories outlined in Rule 23(b). The district court may label the action a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action, where the only unifying feature is that the defendant has injured all of the class members in the same way. Rule 23(b)(3) has two more stringent requirements: First, questions of law or fact common to the class members must predominate over questions affecting individual class members. Second, the district court must find that the "class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FRCP 23(b)(3). If the representative cannot satisfy the general requirements of 23(a), the representative will obviously not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). More interestingly, district courts have used the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) to deny certification despite finding that the named representatives satisfied the more general requirements of Rule 23(a). These courts raised the same arguments used in the adequacy and typicality context, but they concluded that in the individual case they create lesser problems that only rise to the level of compromising predominance and superiority. See, for example, Harding v Tambrands Inc, 165 FRD 623, 629-30 (D Kan 1996) (illustrating that in a case of ongoing or continuous harm the representative's time bar may be more likely to coincide with difficult choice of law problems that undermine superiority).
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A. Class Membership
A time bar may prevent a plaintiff from being a member of the class, making her unfit to serve as the sole named representative. The Supreme Court has ruled that "a class representative must be part of the class and 'possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' as the class members."" The interests of absent class members must be "fairly encompassed within the named plaintiff's claim," and the district court should examine the pleadings, evidence introduced for certification, and evidence uncovered during discovery to determine the representative's class membership."
Courts that have addressed the issue unanimously agree that a time-barred named representative is not "part of the class.'" The functional justifications underlying the class membership requirement provide a persuasive reason to refuse certification. The named representative's time bar deprives her of any interest in the outcome of the litigation; her interests fundamentally diverge from the interests of absent class members with timely claims." The courts cannot trust a named representative without a vested interest in the outcome of the litigation to monitor the plaintiffs' attorney actively or to provide a realistic example of the class's legal claims to the district court.0 The Fourth Circuit and Eighth Circuit properly decided that a named representative who fails to satisfy the statute of limitations is not a member of the class.
The class membership requirement is closely related to Rule 23's other requirements. The Supreme Court reasoned that the named representative's lack of class membership raises problems of commonality, typicality, and adequacy.' By looking to the named representative's class membership, the district court can more easily determine 61 Falcon, 457 US at 157-58 & n 13 (noting the interrelatedness of commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements); East Texas Motor Freight, 431 US at 405-06 ("The mere fact that a complaint alleges racial or ethnic discrimination does not in itself ensure that the party who has brought the lawsuit will be an adequate representative of those who may have been the real victims of that discrimination.").
"whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence."'2 B. Typicality
In some cases, the availability of a statute of limitations defense will render the time-barred plaintiff's legal claims atypical. Rule District courts seem particularly likely to declare the time-barred named representative atypical in two circumstances. First, if the named representative is only one of a few members of the class who suffers from the statute of limitations defect, then the district court will be more willing to declare her atypical.f Second, if the district court suspects that individualized limitations defenses will dominate the litigation, the district court will be more willing to declare the representative atypical.6 Although these decisions will be highly factspecific, a time bar to the named representative's action can create typicality problems.
C. Adequacy
A time bar may prevent a plaintiff from adequately guarding the interests of other class members. Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 6 9 The adequacy requirement prohibits named representatives from maintaining an action when the interests of the named representative diverge from the interests of class members.
The failure of the named representative to satisfy the statute of limitations might compromise adequacy in two ways: First, a time bar might deprive the named representative of a stake in the outcome of the litigation, eliminating her individual incentive to protect the interests of the class. Courts commonly require that, at the time of certification, the named representative have an incentive to prosecute the tangential if the same legal theory underlies the larger case). might choose a particular forum simply because its statute of limitations allows her to maintain her individual action, despite the fact that the forum would apply less favorable substantive law. The choice of substantive law might prejudice class members who could satisfy either state's statute of limitations. The named representative's choice of a forum may create subtle conflicts that would not be readily apparent when the absent member makes the decision to join or abstain from the class." These subtle choice of law problems may create conflicts between the class representative and class members that require judicial attention.
D. Application of Rule 23 by District Courts
Although Rule 23 establishes several analytically distinct requirements for certification, the United States Supreme Court has admitted that these inquiries tend to collapse upon one anotherO District courts analyze the time-barred named representative under various Rule 23 labels and often justify a refusal to certify, in the alternative, under several Rule 23 requirements. District courts presented with large, complex class actions also often fail to attend carefully to "peripheral" statute of limitations issues. The following two cases illustrate that a district court's pragmatic application of Rule 23 can deviate substantially from the idealized approach presented in Parts II.A-C.
In Commander Properties Corporation v Beech Aircraft CorporationSl an airplane owner ("Commander") brought an action against an airplane manufacturer ("Beech") for a wing joint problem. Commander sought certification for a class of all owners of certain Beech airplanes during the relevant time period.8 (Second) of Conflict of Laws the district court will generally apply the forum's statute of limitations).
79 Arthur Miller and David Crump have made a similar argument. Miller and Crump worried that a class attorney's choice of forum might entail a substantive body of state law that favored some members of the class at the expense of others. Although the authors concluded that these conflicts would be too subtle and "ethereal" for consideration by most district courts, Miller The district court initially acknowledged it could not "delve into the merits of the action," but the court proceeded to qualify that statement by saying the court must analyze the claims and defenses of the parties carefully. The court analyzed typicality and adequacy under a single subheading. The court noted that typicality did not impose a requirement that the legal claims be identical. After setting forth this uncontroversial legal proposition, the district court described the typicality requirement as "dovetail[ing]" with the adequacy requirement. 8 Y Beech argued that a statute of limitations defense unique to Commander should render him atypical. Commander arguably had actual notice of the wrong and injury before the other members of the class, and Commander's action was arguably barred by the statute of limitations. The district court refused to reach the question of typicality.
Instead, the district court held that the class action failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s more specific and stringent requirement that questions of law or fact common to the class members must predominate over questions affecting individual class members. The district court ruled that "individual questions of law predominate with respect to ... statute of limitations defenses." 5 The Commander court stated that individual questions of fact would also determine the outcome of the tolling claims and refused to certify the action as a 23(b)(3) class action. ' In Sperling v Donovan, 5 the district court treated the time-barred nature of the representative's claims casually, but its treatment of the issue critically affected the disposition of the case."' In Sperling, the district court refused to certify a class action by two white named plaintiffs who alleged the, Department of Labor had engaged in reverse discrimination. 5 The district court emphasized that the isolated nature of the plaintiff's complaints made them markedly different or atypical from the remainder of the class." In reaching this decision, however, the district court refused to consider the named representative's time-barred claims. 3 The district court naturally assumed it should consider the effects of a time bar when passing on typicality. 9 3 83 Id at 534. 84 Id at 535 ("Atypical claims potentially create antagonistic interests, which will presumably affect Commander's ability to adequately represent the class.").
85 Id at 536-37. 86 Id at 538. 87 Id at 538-39.
104 FRD 4 (D DC 1984).
89 Id at 9. 90 Id at 5-6,9.
91 Id at 7-9.
92
Id at 5 ("The question for the court is whether a class may be certified where, although a
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These district court cases portray the application of Rule 23 in practice. District courts consider multiple features of an action that could disqualify it for class treatment under multiple Rule 23 labels. District courts sometimes conflate analytic categories and attempt to avoid reaching the most difficult issues. These features of low-level decisionmaking make it difficult to distill the importance of deciding individual legal issues under clear analytic labels. Although this Comment's proposal would have generated the same outcome the district courts reached in these cases, class membership, typicality and adequacy each provide independent reasons for deciding how timebarred representatives should be treated.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD CONSIDER TIME BARS
AT CERTIFICATION AND ACT DECISIVELY IN THE FACE OF RULE 23 PROBLEMS
Assuming that the named representative's time bar can create substantial problems under Rule 23, why would district courts not consider those problems at certification? District courts, at least initially, consider most other issues that have Rule 23 implications at certification. Certain advantages, such as judicial economy, fairness to absent class members, and fairness to the defendant flow naturally from applying the same decisionmaking schedule to the time-barred representative. Although district courts cannot investigate the representative's chances of success on the merits at the certification stage, a mandatory, but narrowly tailored, Rule 23 inquiry at certification could weed out some cases in which the named representative's claim is time-barred. Part III.A explores the advantages of applying the requirements of Rule 23 at certification.
If a district court decides the named representative does not satisfy Rule 23 requirements at certification, the district court can allow substitution, redefine the class, limit the size of the class, or strike the class complaint. " Courtschoosing between striking the class complaint or ordering the plaintiffs' attorney to name a new representative frequently allow the plaintiffs' attorney to name another representative.n Allowing substitution reinforces existing incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to name few representatives and creates management difficulties for the district court. Part III.B details automatic substitution's dynamic, deleterious effects. This Comment then proposes that district potential class can be identified, most of the individual plaintiff's claims are time-barred and cannot be revived under a continuing violation theory.").
93 Id at 9 (noting that "[m]ost of plaintiffs' claims in the case at bar are not timely" and moving on to examine only the timely claims to establish the atypicality of the representatives).
94 See notes 130-34.
95 See text accompanying note 136.
courts adopt a meaningful presumption towards striking the class complaints to create incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to name multiple and diverse representatives.
A. District Courts Should Consider Tme Bars to the Named Representative at Certification
If the district court can accurately decide some statute of limitations issues at certification, it will create considerable advantages for the judicial system and litigants. This Part proposes that the district court decide "easy cases" and identify "hard cases" at the certification stage."'
Resolving the statute of limitations issue before certification has two advantages. First, a district court that discovers that a representative fails to satisfy the statute of limitations after discovery and crossmotions for summary judgment faces an unpalatable choice. The district court can decertify and waste the substantial resources expended in discovery, or the district court can allow substitution and risk unfairness to absent class members. Considering the issue before certification allows the district court to dismiss unfit named representatives before the parties or the court have invested heavily in the litigation.7 Second, time-barred representatives may not give the defendant effective notice of the scope and type of her liability within the statutory period. In the class action context, the Supreme Court has relied heavily on the named representative to justify tolling the statute of limitations for all class members. District courts that take the purposes of statutes of limitations seriously should consider these issues early and usually refuse substitution.n Finally, Rule 23 grants the district court sufficient authority to consider some statute of limitations questions at certification.9 As explained in Part II, a representative's time bar directly bears on Rule 23 requirements. District courts have both the authority and competence to evaluate a named representative's time bar at certification.
Courts can accurately decide easy cases at certification.
District courts can resolve certain statute of limitations issues accurately at certification-the easy cases. A district court will find it difficult to decide other statute of limitations issues-the hard cases. When thinking about the relative prevalence of easy and hard statute of limitations questions, it might be useful to think along two dimen-
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Part III.A.1 describes the distinction between easy and hard cases. [67:805 sions. First, a statute of limitations issue might be either shared or individual. A district court's determination could either affect large groups of class members similarly (shared) or each individual class member differently (individual). Second, a shared statute of limitations issue might be legal or factual."O Shared, legal statute of limitations issues will be easy for a district court to resolve at certification. For example, the parties may disagree about characterizing the cause of action as arising in contract or in tort, and the characterization will select the relevant statute of limitations. The characterization issue is a legal question that will critically affect the resolution of the statute of limitations defense for many class members."' Additional discovery will not help a district court resolve the issue. District courts should decide this issue at certification.
Similarly, shared, factual cases might be easy for district courts to resolve at certification.' For example, a plaintiff might claim that the defendant's fraudulent concealment of the wrong should toll the statute of limitations, and the relevant law might establish an objective standard for determining when the plaintiff should have discovered the injury and tolling should cease. In these cases, a district court's factual determination about when the plaintiff should have discovered the injury will resolve the statute of limitations issue for many members of the class. ' 03 100 If discovery is necessary to resolve the issue, it should be considered factual. If discovery is unnecessary, it should be considered legal. Individual statute of limitations issues do not sort themselves into these convenient categories, however, because it is difficult to imagine a statute of limitations question that would call for a separate legal determination for every class member. Consequently, the district court should encounter three types of statute of limitations issues at certification: shared, legal questions; shared, factual questions; and individual questions. 1978) (remarking on the ability to conduct additional discovery of named representatives for the certification hearing); Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7B Federal Practice and Procedure at § 1785 (cited in note 12) ("Going beyond the pleadings is necessary, as a court must understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues.").
103 See Great Rivers Cooperative v Farmland Industries; Inc, 120 F3d 893, 896-99 (8th Cir 1997) (affirming the district court's determination that all class members should have had notice Shared, factual issues might be more difficult than shared, legal issues because they require partial discovery and might bear a greater resemblance to an inquiry into the merits. Nonetheless, limited factual inquiries may save the needless expense of full discovery.
District courts will also face more difficult, individual questions. Individual statute of limitations issues might be more difficult to resolve at certification. For example, a district court will have difficulty determining when each individual member of a class discovered her injury."4
The categories shared factual, shared legal, and individual do not provide a comprehensive taxonomy of statute of limitations issues. These distinctions do, however, roughly capture a sense that district courts have the capacity to resolve some statute of limitations issues accurately very early in the litigation.
If a district court refuses to consider time bars to the named representative at certification, it should offer a compelling reason for doing so.' 4 Although district courts should not resolve every statute of limitations issue at certification, simply identifying difficult questions could facilitate management. For example, the question of whether a defendant fraudulently concealed her tortious behavior might turn on complex substantive issues that the district court wishes to reserve until after full discovery. Identifying the issues, however, will allow the district court to make certain the class is composed of and represented by parties who meet the statute of limitations with and without the fraudulent concealment exception. This places all parties and the court in a better position.
Allowing district courts to consider these issues at certification should not increase the costs of erroneously denying certification. This discretionary approach relies on modest assumptions about a district court's decisionmaking abilities. Even if we do not have much confiof the wrong committed by the defendant).
104 See, for example, Commander Properties, 164 FRD at 529, where the district court refused certification because determining when the class members discovered the harm would require individual findings of fact. [67:805 dence in the ability of district courts to resolve difficult cases prior to certification, we should have confidence in their ability to identify difficult cases at this stage and bracket them for later resolution.'16 Simply identifying the issues will aid the court in making management decisions.
2. Evaluating the time bar after certification risks wasting judicial resources and prejudicing absent class members.
If district courts can dismiss improper classes earlier in the litigation rather than later, it will promote the efficiency goals of Rule 23. As the litigation progresses beyond certification, notice fees and attorneys' fees increase.7 The extensive discovery process that typifies complex class action litigation also consumes significant litigant and judicial resources.'8 Rule 23 seeks to promote judicial and litigant economy by allowing the consolidation of many individual actions into a single, common proceeding." 9 Dismissing a class action far into the process will undermine this central purpose.
Recognizing this, many courts that fail to discover the named representative's time bar until late in the litigation refuse to dismiss the class complaint. Instead, these courts allow another class member to substitute and serve as the named representative. Substitution avoids wasting resources, but has three serious limits.
First, in some cases, automatically relying on substitution may risk binding absent class members to an unfair settlement. Certification presents a major hurdle to most class actions, and settlement often follows closely on the heels of certification."" A district court that fails to consider statute of limitations issues at certification may inadver-106 See Ruhrgas AG v Marathon Oil Co, 526 US 574, 119 S Ct 1563, 1571-72 (1999) (expressing confidence in the ability of the district court to distinguish between hard and easy cases of personal and subject matter jurisdiction early in the litigation). tently distribute settlement proceeds to time-barred class members. Such inadvertent distributions will obviously either reduce the amount awarded to class members with timely claims.. or impose a disproportionate level of liability on the defendant. Although district courts independently review settlement offers, the Supreme Court has stated that this independent review is not sufficient to guard the interests of class members. ' 2 A district court should investigate the named representative's time bar as a factor critical to the fairness of certification. Identifying these issues early and deciding them correctly will reduce the risk of an unfair settlement.
Second, even if a case progresses to trial, certification could compromise the interests of absent class members. A representative's time bar often coincides with difficult choice-of-law issues or ongoing harms. In such cases, the representative's time bar may signal more fundamental problems within the class that might compromise the due process interests of absent class members. In such cases, certification in the face of a representative's time bar might compromise Rule 23 requirements."' Third, as explained in Part III.B, automatically allowing substitution will exaggerate current incentives for class attorneys to name few, non-diverse representatives and exacerbate management problems. This will frustrate district courts' efforts to manage class actions effectively and guarantee the procedural interests of defendants and absent class members.
Considering statute of limitations issues at the certification stage avoids the unpalatable alternatives of late dismissal of the class or late substitution. 119 See American Pipe, 414 US at 552-55 (1977) (emphasizing that the decision was restricted to cases where the class failed for lack of numerosity rather than the representative's lack of adequacy or typicality). 121 The Fourth Circuit recognized that dismissing the named plaintiffs would leave a "headless lawsuit," but remanded the case to the district court to allow substitution, and ignored any problems that might arise from American Pipe tolling. See Goodman v Schlesinger, 584 F2d 1325, 1332 -33 (4th Cir 1978 .
122 Substitution will not remedy the defect. The claims for all class members will be tolled upon filing the class action. If the court allows the substitution of a class member whose claim was not time-barred on the date of filing, the defendant will be caught off guard. Although a named representative's failure to satisfy the statute of limitations seems to speak to the likelihood of her success on the merits, making it inappropriate for consideration at the certification stage, Eisen'2 permits the district court to inquire narrowly whether the statute of limitations defense compromises Rule 23 requirements. The named representative's time bar can be evaluated with reference to Rule 23 requirements rather than the named representative's ultimate chances of success on the merits. Although the Supreme Court refuses to allow district courts to reach conclusions about the ultimate viability of representatives' claims, the Supreme Court has also repeatedly insisted that the named representative "be a part of the class and 'possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' as the class members."' 2 A time-barred representative may suffer serious deficiencies as a representative or signal serious deficiencies in the class.'2 The district court certainly has the authority to inquire about the existence of defenses that might compromise the requirements of Rule
23.126
The discretionary nature of the statute of limitations inquiry should eliminate concerns about reaching substantive conclusions prematurely. Courts can always justify refusing to consider the statute of limitations defense during certification because full discovery is necessary to determine the validity of the defense. Courts could also avoid preliminary conclusions about the statute of limitations if it fears that such conclusions would unfairly prejudice the defendant. For example, if a district court fears that determining whether the defendant fraudulently concealed her tortious conduct would "color the subsequent proceedings and place an unfair burden on the defendant,"'2 then the court could balance that concern against the possibility of compromising notice to the defendant. m A mere justification lows substitution for a named representative, American Pipe tolling will protect the claim of the new named representative and all members of the class). If a district court decides the named representative is inappropriate, it has several options. The district court can allow substitution or intervention by another class member to remedy the defect and leave the class unchanged, " divide the class into subclasses, 3 ' limit the size of the existing class, L 2 or strike the class and allow the action to continue individually. 3 3 A district court theoretically has the discretion to revoke certification and dismiss the class action throughout the trial. In practice, however, the class assumes an independent status after certification, and the district court is much less likely to dismiss9' Courts that find the named representative inappropriate becauise her claim is time-barred typically allow substitution or intervention to remedy the named representative's defects.3 6 These courts, however, 134 See note 28. 135 For example, the district court will often allow an action to proceed if the named representative's claim becomes moot after certification but will require intervention or substitution if the named representative's claim becomes moot prior to certification. Comer v Cisneros, 37 F3d 775,798 (2d Cir 1994) (noting that an individual named plaintiff can continue to represent the interest of the class after certification, even if the plaintiff's individual stake has disappeared). Courts will also ignore the post-trial inadequacy of a named plaintiff Falcon, 457 US at 156 (noting that the case would be different if the named plaintiffs appeared inadequate after certification); Thurston v Dekle, 531 F2d 1264,1270 (5th Cir 1976) (upholding class certification when named plaintiff's failure to satisfy standing requirement was caused by legal interpretation subsequent to his suit, and the new law was unknown both to plaintiff and to trial court), vacated on other grounds, 438 US 901 (1978 class representatives.
The current system also encourages plaintiffs' attorneys to define classes broadly and vaguely. Defining the class too broadly places burdens on the defendant, the court, and absent class members rather than the plaintiffs' attorney; defining the class too narrowly deprives the plaintiffs' attorney of a portion of the potential recovery. The larger the class, the greater the potential recovery and attorneys' fees. "2 In addition, American Pipe tolling encourages the class attorney to define the class broadly. When a complaint names a broader class, the statute of limitations will be tolled for a larger number of people.
14 These combined incentives can create an inefficient dynamic: plaintiffs' attorneys will systematically create large, unwieldy classes without naming diverse representatives. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs' attorney, rather than the court, is in a better position to divine potential conflicts among the class, differences in the class, and effective management devices.
2. Information-eliciting penalty defaults.
District courts should adopt a meaningful presumption towards dismissing a class when all of the named representatives fail to satisfy the statute of limitations. This presumption would punish individual plaintiffs' attorneys who brought class actions naming only timebarred representatives. It would establish incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to consider statute of limitations issues more carefully and name multiple, diverse representatives.
Dismissing these complaints would impose two costs on plaintiffs' attorneys who file class actions naming time-barred representatives. First, plaintiffs' attorneys who file a class action and lose the certifica-tion hearing risk reducing the size of their class fee." The market for class actions is extremely robust," and plaintiffs' attorneys have few resources to dedicate to uncovering potential class actions."' Plaintiffs' attorneys lower search costs by relying heavily on the news media and filings by other attorneys to uncover profitable class actions. Filing the class action signals the availability of a profitable class action to other attorneys; these attorneys will race to find representatives and file suit.' 0 If the plaintiffs' attorney loses the certification hearing, then it gives competing attorneys additional time to find representatives and attempt to share in the class fee.
Second, each additional certification hearing costs plaintiffs' attorneys. A second certification hearing will require additional legal research, discovery, and search costs.' 0 This presumption may reduce the absolute number of class claims filed, but it should not substantially reduce the number of meritorious claims filed. Many plaintiffs' attorneys fiercely compete to litigate a limited number of profitable class actions. 49 At first cut, this minimal cost should not substantially reduce the number of class attorneys or the number of class suits filed.
Even if the presumption lowers the absolute number of class actions filed, it should shift more resources to meritorious claims. Raising standards for certification will force the plaintiffs' attorney to direct resources prior to certification more carefully. Carefully organizing frivolous claims constitutes an unnecessary cost. If the plaintiffs' attorney has a meritorious class claim, however, the expected value of the case is higher, and the district court's certification denial will draw fierce competition from other attorneys. When district courts reject hastily organized meritorious claims, the plaintiffs' attorney will lose a larger share of the class fee to competitors. The marketplace will reward plaintiffs' attorneys for accurately sorting meritorious and frivolous claims earlier, and it will reward early investments in meritorious class claims.
Encouraging more careful organization of class actions and naming multiple, diverse representatives will have several important advantages. First, the plaintiff's attorney has more information about the composition of the class and the facts that gave rise to the suit. Early in the action, the district court has few opportunities to conduct extensive fact finding.m If a district court can force the plaintiffs' attorney to disclose most of the relevant information, then the court can make more informed management decisions early in the litigation.
Second, this presumption facilitates the notice requirements of American Pipe. A larger and more diverse set of named representatives will give the defendant better notice of the potential number and type of claims encompassed by the putative class. ' Third, this presumption forces a clarification of the class itself. A more diverse set of named representatives will make conflicts more readily apparent and facilitate the early development of subclasses. Even harsh critics of the current adequacy and typicality requirements admit that the named representative provides the district court with information about the internal composition of the class. A larger and more diverse set of named representatives will reveal internal class conflicts earlier and allow the district court to manage the case more effectively.
CONCLUSION
Timing matters. All courts agree that a time-barred representative fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23. Refusing to allow districts court to consider easy statute of limitations issues at certification forces the court to choose later between wasting substantial resources or prejudicing absent class members. Furthermore, if the named representative is later dismissed, then the initial class complaint does not provide the defendant with notice of the scope and type of her liability within the statutory period. A carefully limited inquiry into the named representative's time bar could avoid reaching substantive conclusions about the representative's chances of success on the merits. At certification, district courts should narrowly investigate whether If district courts routinely consider the matter at certification, then they will often face the question of what to do with a headless class. Rather than ordering remedial steps, these courts should strike the class action. By striking the class complaint when the named representative fails to satisfy the statute of limitations, district courts can encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to name multiple and diverse representatives, facilitating more effective management of the class action.
